An exchange of letters in this issue of Documenta Ophthalmologica highlights the tension which arises as we incorporate the results of genetic testing into the diagnosis of patients on clinical grounds (Finsterer and ''MELAS'' (i.e. Mitochondrial myopathy, Encephalopathy, Lactic Acidosis and recurrent cerebral episodes resembling Strokes) was proposed as a new syndromic entity by Pavlakis et al. [1] . They reported on two patients, and identified nine others in the existing literature, characterized by ''ragged red fibers evident on muscle biopsy, normal early development, short stature, seizures, and hemiparesis, hemianopia, or cortical blindness, with lactic acidemia as a common finding.'' The most common causative mitochondrial mutation-3243A-G transition in MTTL1-was first identified by Goto et al. [2] , though several other mitochondrial mutations have also been reported.
Of course, the clinical presentations of these various patients, even those of the original cohort, have differed in detail. It is thus not surprising that different investigators may choose to emphasize different sets of features as the ''key'' findings in applying the label ''MELAS'' to these patients. Finsterer and Bastovansky [3] have suggested the term ''MIMODS'' (MItochondrial Multiorgan Disorder Syndrome) for those patients with mitochondrial disorders which do not fit any of the more than 50 acronyms which stand for specific mitochondrial syndromes, but it is not clear that this suggestion has been widely adopted.
On the other hand, Ozawa and colleagues originally chose to label their patient as having ''MELAS'' based on a subset of the list of findings typical of MELAS patients, together with identification of a mitochondrial deletion mutation (m.3271delT) reported in a minority of MELAS patients [4] .
The discrepancy is a manifestation of the everevolving state of our ability to name and classify diseases (''nosology''). The historical approach has necessarily been based on clinical findings but has always evolved with the availability of new diagnostic tools-indeed, this journal has been dedicated to the elucidation of one such family of diagnostic tools, clinical electrophysiology of vision. With the S. E. Brodie (&) NYU Langone Health, New York, NY, USA e-mail: scott.brodie@nyumc.org widespread introduction of DNA sequencing methods over the last decade, many have suggested that the diagnosis of genetic disease would soon be reduced to a matter of simply ''reading the DNA.'' It hasn't worked out that way. Different patients diagnosed with the same well-established clinical syndromes have been found to harbor multiple causative mutations. Conversely, patients with the same mutations have been found to present with quite distinct clinical syndromes, or to be completely free of clinical disease. There are many explanations and excuses for these discrepancies, from evoking unknown ''environmental factors,'' to complex ''multi-genic inheritance'' and the ever-present ''incomplete penetrance.'' Similar ''hedges'' are likewise prevalent in our clinical diagnoses-we encounter ''incomplete'' forms of many disorders, describe patients lacking some syndrome components as ''formes frustes'' or ''atypical examples. '' In fact, there have never been agreed-upon criteria for the establishment of a diagnostic category. Disorders are organized by some combination of sex, inheritance pattern, age, organ system, causation, and other factors. In some cases, the decisions as to which patients to include are made by expert committees, frequently resorting to elaborate, and clearly arbitrary, decision trees-so many ''major criteria'' and/or so many ''minor criteria.'' The lists of available diagnoses have recently proliferated to an extraordinary degree-the current version of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases mandated for use in the USA (ICD-10-CM) contains over 70,000 codes, some of which defy credulity. Consider: W55.22XA, ''Struck by cow, initial encounter'' or V91.07XA; ''Burn due to water-skis on fire, initial encounter.'' Good luck with that! Ultimately, we cannot avoid the reality that our diagnoses are frequently artificial constructs, which are of value only to the extent that they effectively allow us to organize and share our experience with patients, predict prognosis with a useful degree of accuracy, and propose or evaluate possible therapies. A dogmatic approach as to the role of particular diagnostic dimensions, including DNA sequencing, is unlikely to be productive.
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